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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

DONNA R. BULLOCK, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
HERBERT JOHN UNGRICHT, et al.,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
13697

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appellant, Donna R. Bullock, appeals from a
judgment for the Defendant-Respondent, on a personal
injury accident by the Third Judicial District Court, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial was held on Appellant's claim for personal
injury which she suffered when her automobile was struck
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in the rear by Defendant-Respondent's station wagon just
east of Highland Drive on 3300 South Street, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, and a jury award of no cause of
action rendered April 4, 1974, before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, District Judge, of the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on which a motion
for new trial was heard and denied by Judge Croft on
the 18th day of April, 1974. Upon said judgment and
the denial of the motion for a new trial by the Court,
adverse to Plaintiff, this appeal was filed in the Supreme
Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of the Third
Judicial District Court below, and a new trial, based upon
the admission by the Court of evidence of bankruptcy
and two judgments attendant thereto. Such past bankruptcy and judgments were irrelevant to any legitimate
issue involved in the trial and were inadmissible upon the
issue of credibility, the trial judge's basis for admitting
them. Such admission into evidence was prejudicial
error.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is a case involving a rear end personal injury
accident. The automobile Appellant was operating, a
1970 Maverick, was struck in the rear by Respondent's
automobile, a 1970 Buick station wagon, operated by one
of the Respondents, Herbert John Ungricbt, son of the
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owner. The accident occurred December 16, 1971 at
about 9:00 o'clock p.m., at approximately 1435 East 3300
South Street, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Plaintiff's car was stopped on 3300 South with the left signal
blinking, the car positioned in the center-most eastbound
Ian of traffic on 330 South, waiting to make a left turn
into the driveway directly east of an apartment building
numbered 1435 East 3300 South.
The Respondent driver, with his entire family, had
left the Hawaiian Restaurant on Highland Drive and
was proceeding home after dinner, following route south
on Highland Drive and thence east on 3300 South. While
waiting to make her turn, Appellant noticed in the rearview mirror headlights approaching rapidly. Shortly
thereafter, there was an impact of the left front of the
Respondent's station wagon to the right rear of the Appellant's Maverick. The resultant impact caused personal
injury to the Appellant which was to eventually result
in serious injuries including permanent injury to the
sixth cervical nerve and necessitating the removal of two
cervical dies.
There was conflict on the testimony as to what occurred immediately prior to impact, the Respondent's
witnesses maintaining that Appellant was slowing and
than moving ahead and slowing and moving ahead just
prior to impact and the Appellant maintaining that she
had pulled to a stop and was waiting for traffic to clear
so that she could make her left hand turn just prior to
impact. Appellant was examined by a family physician;
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subsequently saw a Dr. Berntson and other experts and
underwent surgery at Dr. Berntson's hand. There was
conflict in the medical testimony as is usually the case
in a hotly contested matter. The accident occurred nine
(9) days before Christmas, it was dark, and traffic was
heavy, both cars had their lights on. The area was generally well lighted being adjacent to Dee's Hamburger
on the southeast corner of the intersection and floodlights
for Dee's parking area had it fairly well lighted.
The medical evidence indicated that after a lengthy
evaluation, the problems of the Appellant were pinpointed.
Dr. Berntson operated to remove her two cervical discs.
Dr. Pettijohn of the University Hospital gave his expert
medical testimony that the Appellant's injuries involved
permenent nerve damage to the C-6 nerve route leaving
loss of feeling and ability in a portion of the right arm.
This injury is permanent and the Appellant can expect
little improvement over her present condition. Respondent's medical experts testified contra to the above and
one, Dr. Martin, expressed his opinion that Mrs. Bullock
needed no surgery whatever. From the result of the four
day trial, it is apparent that the jury did not reach the
question of damages as they returned a verdict for the
Defendant. The Court, upon motion of the Appellant
for a new trial, denied the same.
In the
spondent's
concerning
tion of her

course of cross-examination of Appellant, Recounsel, after going into matters generally
her age, her family circumstances and a pordirect testimony concerning how the accident
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occurred,, proceeded to interrogate Appellant on her income tax which questions and answers commence at Plage
395, Line 15 of the transcript. The Court's attention
is drawn to the questions and answers from Plage 395
through Page 436 of the transcript which includes questions by Respondent's counsel of the Appellant on crossexamination relative to a bankruptcy which was filed in
April of 1971 by Appellant, the objections of the Appellant's counsel, and the ruling of the Court in relation
thereto. The Court should particularly note Plage 426
of the transcript where Appellant's counsel is objecting
to the introduction of the bankruptcy and any additional
material related to it. Counsel for the Respondent, in
answering counsel for Appellant and his objections, indicates commencing at Line 30 on Page 415 of the transcript, "I recognize that counsel doesn't like it because"
(then proceeding to Line of Page 426 of the transcript,
the then next numbered page) (an error on the part of
the record) and continues, "in my judgment, it will have
an adverse effect and that is wy I am seeking to introduce it." The Court allowed the evidence of the bankruptcy into trial for purposes of impeachment of credibility.
Counsel for Respondent specifically referred to the
filing of the Bankruptcy Proceeding and previous testimony that he elicited from Appellant thereabout, this
particular argument having to do with whether or not
additional exhibits or information related to it would be
accepted by the Court.
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Respondent claims for such information a probative
value related to the injury of Mrs. Bullock and what
emotional involvement there may have been to that bankruptcy filed eight (8) months prior to the date of the
accident. There was some testimony from the medical
witnesses that as a result of their examination, Appellant's
doctors felt that Mrs. Bullock was emotionally upset at
the time she was examined. Respondent's counsel urged
on Court and jury that this could have been aggravated
by the filing of the bankruptcy as a pre-existing condition*
Appellant urged, at that time, upon the Court and
jury that the filing of a bankruptcy eight (8) months
prior to an automobile rear end collision, as was the case
before it, had little and really nothing to do with the
case at bar.
The Appellant sought to withdraw any claim concerning lost wages after the ruling of the trial court below that the same were speculative. The Court denied
said motion. Respondent insisted on the retention of
the references to the bankruptcy and the examination
recorded of the Appellant on the theory of credibility
impeachment and relevancy to the issue of a lost earnings, though this issue was removed from consideration
by the trial court below.
From the foregoing Statement of Facts, the Appellant respectfully submits her argument as follows:
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING
D E F E N D A N T S TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF SPECIFIC ACTS OF PRIOR
ALLEGED MISCONDUCT TO IMPEACH
PLAINTIFF'S CREDIBILITY.
Other than showing a conviction for a crime amounting to a felony for dishonesty or false statement, the
Court below could not permit evidence that the Appellant-witness had committed wrongful acts or that she
had "bad character". The Supreme Court of the State
of Washington enunciated the general rule that evidence
of specific acts of misconduct which tend to disgrace a
witness cannot be elicited from the witness on cross-examination for purposes of impeaching him, or attacking
his credibility. In the Washington case, Warren vs. Hynes,
Wash. (1940), 102 P. 2d 691, an action by a minor through
a guardian ad litem, for a personal injury sustained to
the minor in an automobile accident, the trial resulted
in a verdict for the Respondent. As part of the evidence^
the trial court allowed a question relative to the occupation of the party, to which the answer was given "none".
On further examination, it was apparent that the purpose
of the question was disclosure of the fact that Defendant
made his living in the past stealing automobiles as a
means of livelihood or as one of his main activities. The
Court states at Page 696:
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The mere query whether appellant's occupation had been that of an automobile thief,
which question was not material to the issues in
the cause, was intended to, and doubtless did,
arouse the animosity of the jury toward appellant and he was thereby denied a fair trial. State
vs. Tweedy, 165 Wash. 281, 5 P. 2d 335; State
vs. Devlin, 145 Wash. 44, 258 P. 826. To further
interrogate Warren, whose character was not an
issue, as to whether he had "held up" the two
men standing in the court room was additional
reversible error.
Further, in the same case, the court held that the
answer of a witness on cross-examination on collateral
matters regarding specific acts which would show past
conduct was reversible error.
The Utah Rules of Evidence provide for impeachment of a witness because a witness' character for truthfulness is always an issue. Utah Rules of Evidence 20
provides:
. . . any party including the party calling
him may examine him and introduce extrinsic
evidence concerning any statement or conduct
by him and any other matter relevant upon the
issues of credibility.
For public policy reasons, Rule 20 was specifically
made subject to Rules 21 and 22. Rule 21, the modern
view, provides that conviction of a crime not involving
dishonesty shall be inadmissible to impair credibility.
Rule 22 (c) and (d) provide:
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(c) evidence of traits of his character
other troth, honesty, or integrity of their opposites, shall be inadmissible;
(d) evidence of specific instances of his
conduct relevant only as tending to prove a trait
of his character, shall be inadmissible.
As can be seen, affecting the credibility of a witness,
Rule 22(c) provides that evidence of traits of character
other than truth, honesty, or integrity or their opposites,
shall be inadmissible; and Rule 22(d), provides that
evidence of specific instances of conduct relevant only
as tending to prove a trait of character, shall be inadmissible. Such Rules are the limiting rules on impeachment of credibility by showing bad character.
Such evidence is admissible if it qualifies under Rules
46 and 47. For clarity, these rules are set forth in entirety as follows:
Rule 46. Character — Manner of Proof
When a person's character or a trait of his
character is in issue, it may be proved by testimony in the form of opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of the
person's conduct, subject, however, to the limitations of Rules 47 and 48.
Rule 47. Character Trait as Proof of Conduct
Subject to Rule 48, when a trait of a person's
character is relevant as tending to prove his conduct on a specified occasion, such trait may be
proved in the same manner as provided by Rule
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46, except that (a) evidence of specific instances
of conduct other than evidence of conviction of
a crime which tends to prove the trait to be bad
shall be inadmissible, and (b) in a criminal action
evidence of a trait of an accused's character as
tending to prove his guilt or innocence of the
offense charged, (i) may not be excluded by the
judge under Rule 45 if offered by the accused
to prove his innocence, and (ii) if offered by the
prosecution to prove his guilt, may be admitted
only after the accused has introduced evidence of
his good character.
It is clear from the Utah Rules of Evidence that
character is to be proven by reputation, opinion, or specific acts tending to prove conduct on a specific occasion.
I t was for the foregoing reasons that the Court in Warren,
supra, held that the motorist's occupation was not material to issues in an action for a personal injury sustained
in a collision and that examination thereon denied the
motorist a "fair trial".
As can be seen from the trial transcript in the case
at hand, the very right protected by the above Rules
was breached. When Respondent attempted to introduce
testimony of a bankruptcy, objection was made to such
introduction (T. 396,9 and T. 396.25). The specific reason for such objection was given (T. 413.21).
Respondent thereupon pointed out that he sought
to introduce such evidence to attack Appellant's credibility by showing her poor business ethics (T. 415.13-14)
(T. 426.1-3).
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Professor Phillip Schuchman, in his much quoted
summary of the law, An Attempt at a Philosophy of
Bankruptcy, 21 U.C.L.A. L.R. 403, 1971, points out
that at law, the ethical position of bankruptcy, is that
of simple, fairly conventional utihtarianism. By putting
the entire question into its realistic context, we realize
the fallacy, according to Professor Shuchman, of insisting by our Victorian notions, that the moral man will
pay his debts regardless of business misfortune.
Bankruptcy, therefore, is not amoral or a "dirty
word". Yet there is need to recognize the impact on the
private citizen or the general member of the community.
To him, bankruptcy is a "dirty word". Such a reality
caused Professor Shuchman to point out that:
(2) The process of personal bankruptcy
need not be made unpleasant; and, in the absence
of ethical consensus and more information on the
psychological consequences of bankruptcy, should
not be degrading and should avoid stigmatizing. Id. at Page 474. (Emphasis ours.)
Since it is clear that a bankruptcy has little to do
with ethics, the obvious purpose was to lay a founddation for the introduction of specific acts of misconduct
or misrepresentation connected therewith (T. 415.8) (T.
415.30) (T. 426.1 and 2).
The Court allowed the introduction of such evidence
over Appellant's objection, because Appellant had introduced prior testimony of lost earnings (T. 429.22).
However, after conversation with counsel, the Court re-
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moved the issue of business earnings from the jury's determination, but still allowed the bankruptcy evidence
and acknowledgment of Appellant as to the two judgments theron to remain (T. 433.17). In other words, the
trial court was recognizing the fact that bankruptcy is
a "dirty word" and that it could be used to question the
Appellant's credibility.
Specific attention is diiiected to the court's direction
on the allowance of the evidence (T. 432.21). The Court
pointed out correctly that Rule 22(c) provides for admissibility of traits of character for truth, honesty or
integrity, or their opposites. However,, the Court foiled
to recognize the limitation placed upon (c) by considering (d):
Rule 22 (d) evidence of specific instances of
his conduct relevant only as tending to prove
a trait of his character, shall be inadmissible."
For these reasons the ruling of the trial court was
contrary to law, and beyond the judge's power of discretion, and the Court's ruling was error.
An additional case supports the above position. In
United States vs. John David Provoo, (2 Cir., 1954), 215
F. 2d 531, the Court held that in the prosecution of a
former army staff sergeant for treason alleged to have
been committed while he was a Japanese prisoner of war,
the District Court's permission to cross-examine the Defendant as to whether his homosexuality was the real
cause of his confinements, to which he testified on direct
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examination, was error prejudicial to the Defendant so
as to require a reversal of his conviction. The Court held,
stating the proposition as enunciated heretofore within
the limits of the Rules of Evidence, that when a person
takes the witness stand and subjects himself to crossexamination, held, like other witnesses, may have his credibility impeached. But this could not be done by introducing specific acts of misconduct by him, not resulting
in his conviction for a felony or a crime of moral turpitude, and these were improper subjects of cross-examination for such purpose.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURTS ADMISSION OF
SPECIFIC ACTS OF PRIOR MISCONDUCT
TO ATTACK PLAINTIFF'S CREDIBILITY
PREJUDICED PLAINTIFF'S CASE AND
RESULTED IN REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Below, the Respondent urged upon the Court the
argument that the inclusion of the evidence of bankruptcy
was germain to the issue of emotional upset of some sort
of "overlay" on the theory that some of the complainte
Appellant had were really the result of the alleged trauma
she suffered as a result of her filing the bankruptcy eight
(8) months earlier, and not solely as a result of the personal injury received in the accident.. However, Appelltnt
testified of permanent nerve damage and removal of two
cervical discs (T. 231, 232, 233). Such testimony was
corroborated by Appellant's expert witnesses (T. 336.12)
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(T. 336, 337, 338, 339) (T. 464, 465). One such expert
verified that the medical condition of the Appellant were
consistent with the nature of the rear end collision which
occurred (T. 462).
The Court's error was to allow this evidence of bankruptcy to remain on the issue of credibility. That error
was further compounded by the Court instructing counsel
for the Respondent that he leeway to so argue to the
jury when the Court, in fact, had ruled as a matter of law
that any evidence concerning lost wages was going to
to be excluded. This was prejudicial to the Appellant
and denied her a fair trial.
A case that well evidences the danger of this kind
of latitude being exercised by a trial court and the damage that can occur therefrom is Champion vs. Brooks
Transportation Company, Inc., Stoneberry vs. Same, 77
U. S. App, D. C. 293, 135 F. 2d 652, (1943). This was
a person injury action by the occupants of an automobile
struck by the Defendant's truck. Evidence was introduced
at trial that (1) the occupants of the oar on perhaps a
half dozen occasions had visited a specific night club in
the greater metropolitan Washington, D. C. area, (2)
that one of the occupants of the automobile had gambled
at this night club and had in fact gambled there on the
night of the accident, and (3) that the oocupants of the
car who were struck in the rear, were aware that the
automobile they occupied was furnished to them by the
night club owner. The Appellate Court says on age 655:
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The single issue on which we may take cognizance is the admissibility of the evidence, over
Plaintiff's objection, that they had on perhaps
a half a dozen occasions visited the Maryland
Athletic Club, apparently "Jimmie LaFontaine's
Place": that one of the Plaintiffs had gambled
thereon on those occasions and had gambled
there on the night of the accident; and that the
Plaintiffs were aware that the car occupied by
them, which was returning them to the District,
was furnished by "LaFontaine". The Court
wisely states the General Rules of Evidence with
counsel of such standing parading the name of
"Jimmie LaFontaine's Place" through pages and
pages of cross-examination, we assume the jury
may have assumed that the "Maryland Athletic
Club" and "Jimmie LaFontaine's Place" were
synonymout terms . . . It might have been used
and repeated to produce a disagreeable taste in
the jury's mouth.
The Court further held that conviction of a gambling
crime would not have been admissible on the witnesses'
credibility, neither would the testimony of indecent exposure have permitted the introduction of evidence relative to a Defendant's credibility of prior illicit sex relations. The Court had held that a further case, Sanford
vs. United States, 69 App. D. C. 44, 98 F. 2d 325, (1938),
would not permit evidence of a mere charge of disorderly
conduct or of an arrest for disorderly conduct to be admissible to effect credibility. The Appellate Court held
that the admission of the contested evidence was prejudicial error compelling the reversal of the judgment and
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the Court remanded the cases back to the trial courts
for conformity with their opinion.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania further held in
Commonwealth vs. Truitt, 39 Pa. 72, 85 A. 2d 425, 30
A. L. R. 2d 572, (1953), that admission of evidence of
communistic connections in a criminal prosecution constituted reversible error. The Court, in this case involving assault, battery, resisting an officer and obstructing
an arrest, stated on Page 527 as follows:
In rebuttal the Commonwealth offered the
testimony of Matt Cvetic, who styled himself
"an undercover agent with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation". His testimony was offered to
attack the credibility of Defendant Truitt's testimony when he denied that he was a communist. An objection was then entered by the
attorney for Defendants, which was overruled
and an exception allowed.. The witness was permitted to testify that Truitt was an active communist, and gave testimony concerning Truitt's
communist activities. This was clearly error.
Truitt's testimony, on cross-examination, that he
was not a communist was obviously upon a collateral matter. A witness cannot be contradicted
on collateral matters to test credibility.
Secondly, the Court stated at 30 A. L. R. 2d 578:
Defendant Truitt, without objection, was
cross-examined concerning his membership in the
Progressive Party, and whether or not such political party was "dominated by communists".
Here again, such testimony was without the
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slightest probative or relevant value. If it had
been objected to it ought to have been excluded.
In the instant case, evidence of a prior bankruptcy
in a personal injury suit is evidence of prior specific acts.
Aside from the fact that a bankruptcy does not show
bad character under the law, the evidence could not be
admitted under any exception to the general rules above
set forth.
The consideration of two exceptions will complete the
discussion on impeachment. In People v. Hurlburt, 166
Cal. App, 2d 334, 33 P. 2d 82, 75 A. L. R. 2d 500, (1958),
the Court was confronted with a prosecution for lewd
conduct. The Court first discussed an exception to the
general rule above by saying, "In sex cases of various
sorts, exceptions to its application have been recognized."
Secondly, the Court stated:
The rule contained in Section 2051 is a sound
one, and exists in most jurisdictions. It is that,
while a witness may be impeached "by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad", evidence of specific
acts of bad character, except as to conviction of
a felony, is generally not admissible. But where
the issue goes beyond general reputation and involves the truthfulness of the basic fact in issue,
evidence of particular wrongful acts may be admissible.
Additionally, Hockaday vs. Redline, Inc., 85 U. S.
App. D. C. 1, 174 F. 2d 154, (1949), a personal injury
action, is supportive of this view. This Court denied an
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appeal from a judgment after a jury verdict in favor of
the Appellee, where a motion for a new trial was filed
and denied. The specific issue was whether the conduct
of the Appellee's counsel, both in a cross-examination
and in argument, was calculated to prejudice the jury
against the Appellant to the extent that a new trial
would be warranted.
The Appellant filed to recover damages for certain
injuries sustained when the Defendant's truck was in
a collision with the Plaintiff. The Court held that in a
personal injury action, cross-examination as to a prior
conviction of assault for impeachment purposes, was
proper, but that further cross-examination to show revocation of a suspended sentence because of Plaintiff's
failure to enter the military service, was prejudicial to
the Plaintiff and constituted reversible error. The Court
further stated that it is the duty of Court and counsel
to prevent the jury from considering extraneous issues,
irrelevant evidence and erroneous views of the law. That
duty, the Court pointed out, extended to guarding the
jury against influence of passion and prejudice so that
the parties may obtain a fair and impartial trial. The
Court further stated, that the failure of the Court or
counsel to discharge this duty constitutes reversible error.
The 6th Circuit is in accord. In Smith vs. U. S., (6th
Cir. 1960), 283 F. 2d 16, the Defendant was convicted of
telephoning a false bomb threat to an airport control
tower. The Court held that without proper foundation,
collateral matters were properly excluded. Thereupon,
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the Court, in summarizing the rules set forth above, stated
as follows:
The type of questions permitted to impeach
a witness are those which show that he committed a felony or crime involving moral turpitude.
It would not be proper to show for impeachment purposes that the witness had been convicted of disorderly conduct, of violating the
traffic law of either state or municipality or
that he was convicted of crimes not involving
moral turpitude.
The act of permitting testimony of a bankruptcy to
remain in evidence after removing the issue of business
earnings was one of allowing a collateral issue of a supposed specific misconduct to remain for the purpose of
impeachment. As such, the ruling of the lower court
should be held reversible error.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN THAT WHEN APPELLANT SOUGHT TO OFFER EXPLANATORY
EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE BANKR U P T C Y T H E T R I A L C O U R T ANNOUNCED THAT IF SUCH EXPLANATORY
EVIDENCE WERE INTRODUCED, THE
COURT WOULD PERMIT THE INTRODUCTION OF TWO DOCUMENTS WHICH HAD
BEEN PROFFERED BY RESPONDENTS
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AND MARKED "12D", BUT WHICH DOCUMENTS CONTAINED HIGHLY INFLAMM A T O R Y MATERIAL DESIGNED TO
PREJUDICE THE APPELLANT.
Counsel for appellant pointed out to the trial court
that if the bankruptcy evidence were allowed to remain
in, the appellant would have to come back with an explanation of the bankruptcy, all of which would unnecessarily consume the time of the trial court (T. 427.9-10)
(T. 431.21-28) (T. 432.1-6). Rule 45 was emphasized
to the court.
The trial court refused to allow appellant to offer
any explanation for the bankruptcy without precdipitating
the admission of proffered Exhibit 12D into evidence (T.
434.1-17).
The ruling of the trial court in refusing to permit
appellant to offer any explanation of the bankruptcy
without effecting the introduction of the highly inflammatory proffered 12D into evidence placed the appellant
in an impossible position and highly prejudiced the case
of the appellant. This was truly error on the part of the
trial court and said error deprived the plaintiff of a fair
trial. The facts of the accident are quite simple and the
testimony of the appellant, if believed by the jury, would
require a verdict in her favor (T. 222-258). The jury
was out approximately five hours wrestling the matter
of liability. It is perfectly obvious that the problem was
the credibility of the plaintiff which had been seriously
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and erroneously damaged by the aforesaid errors of the
trial court. The action of the trial court in holding proffered Exhibit 12D over her head and threatening to use
it as a sword if she sought to explain why she took bankruptcy is almost incredible. Either 12D was proper evidence or it was not. We have demonstrated that it was
not. The court, in referring to said proffered exhibit,
said that it "suggests a dishonest thing" (T. 432.20
through T. 433.11). The respondents were, once again,
seeking to destroy the crediibility of the appellant by
using a specific instance of her conduct to influence the
jury to believe that the appellant was dishonest and not
to be trusted. The threat of the trial court to allow this
improper evidence to be received if the appellant sought
to explain the reasons why she took bankruptcy and the
reasons for the business failure was highly prejudicial
and unfair to the appellant. There is no question about
the fact that the appellant was highly prejudiced in the
eyes of the jury.
There is no question about the fact that it was error
for the trial court to permit evidence of appellant's bankruptcy to be admitted. There is no question about the
fact that said bankruptcy evidence was prejudicial to the
credibility of the plaintiff. In fact, the court made it very
clear that counsel for the respondents was free to argue
to the question of credibility of the plaintiff as a result
of the bankruptcy. It is obvious that the evidence of the
bankruptcy shook the faith of the jurors in the appellant,
particularly since since she was not allowed to offer any

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22

explanation whatsoever for having taken the bankruptcy.
She was prepared to offer an explanation which would
have made her look much tetter before the jury. The
court, however, used the threat of allowing improper evidence to come in to effectively prevent the appellant
from giving such explanation to the jury. This was gross
error of a highly prejudicial nature. It definitely deprived the appellant of a fair trial and, without question,
affected the outcome of the trial. When a jury can spend
five hours on the mere question of liability in a relatively
simple rear-end automobile collision, it is obvious that
they were concerned about the credibility of the appellant. Furthermore, the verdict, as the record will show
was a split verdict, with only six voting in favor of the
verdict. There is every reason to believe that the result
would have been different had the aforesaid prejudicial
errors not been committed.
POINT IV.
A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT S I N C E T H E
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
BECAUSE EVIDENCE OF SPECIFIC ACTS
WAS INTRODUCED TO ATTACK PLAINTIFF'S CREDIBILITY.
In Woodhouse vs. Johnson, 20 Utah 2d 210, 436 P.
2d 442, (1968), the Utah Supreme Court stated that on
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appeal it is the duty of the Court to assume that the jury
believed all the evidence that supports their verdict and
for that reason the Court would review the evidence and
whatever inferences can fairly and reasonably be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to it.
Generally, a motion or other application for a new
trial is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court,
but as sitated above, the presumption is that the trial
court properly exercised its discretion. See 55 A. L. R.
2d 884.
The general exception thereto is well stated in 58
Am. Jur. 2d Page 443 as follows:
However, the granting or refusal of a new
trial on account of alleged errors of law occurring in the course of a trial, is not a matter of
discretion and is fully subject to review by the
appellate court.
The same section of 58 Am. Jur. 2d at P&ge 434
states:
Ctaxiinarily a motion or other application for
a new trial is directed to the sound discretion of
the trial court, and on appeal from an order entared by the trial court in the exercise of discretion the presumption is that the trial court properly exercised its discretion. However, the granting or refusal of a new trial on account of alleged
errors of law occurring in the course of the trial
is not a matter of discretion and is fully subject
to review by the appellate court.
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It would follow logically from the quoted material
above, that on grounds other than errors of law, the material must be prejudicial, but the reverse is true, as to
errors of law or mixed errors of law and fact. These need
not be prejudicial to constitute reversible error.
Additionally, "where comments by a trial judge indicate that he misconceived his duty, the appellate court
will not blindly affirm the judgment below because there
is some evidence to support it." (People vs. Robarge,
41 Cal. 2d 628, 262 P. 2d 14, (1953); cf. Ehrenreich vs.
Shelton, 213 Cal. App. 2d 375, 28 Cal. Rptr. 855, 1963);
Smith vs. Fetterhoff, 140 Cal. App. 2d 471, 295 P. 2d 474,
(1956); Cosnell vs. Webb, 60 Cal. App. 2d 1, 139 P. 2d
985, (1943).
In the case at bar, regardless of the court's belief
that the issue and evidence of bankruptcy went to credibility, or was justified on the basis of previous testimony
of evidence of prior earnings, it can manifestly be seen
that the court misconstrued the situation and in fact
allowed questions concerning a specific act, "bankruptcy",
at a different time and for a different purpose than the
matter at trial. This misconception on the part of the
court is further buttressed by the inclusion of Instruction
No. 20 as follows:
At the beginning of this trial it was stated
that Plaintiff was claiming as an element of damages, a loss of earnings of $1,000 per month from
a company recently formed and about to commence business. During the trial, testimony has
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been given with respect to such alleged salary.
Under the la wof the state of Utah, speculative
damages are not recoverable and based upon the
evidence presented during the trial the court has
ruled as a matter of law that the claimed loss of
earnings is too speculative to merit any consideration of the evidence presented ameerning such
claimed loss.
Consequently, the testimony regarding the
alleged loss of earnings is to be disregarded by
you and should your verdict be in favor of the
Plaintiff, you are not to make any award to her
for such claimed loss of earnings and you are
not to consider evidence relating thereto in detennining what amount of damages, if any, should
be awarded to Plaintiff (T. 659).
Just prior to this objection to Instruction 20, counsel
for the Respondent, displayed his basic reason for eliciting this testimony by stating, "The only prior history
which we have is in her prior business venture. She
flailed and a bankruptcy ensued" (T. 651).
Immediately thereafter, the couri; made the further
siiatement showing its predisposition:
But in addition to that, the positive evidence
indicated that in the prior year or so in which
Mrs. Bullock was engaged in a similar type of
activity to be undertaken in the corporation, that
she had in fact ended up in the banlotiptcy court
(T. 652).
It is clear that the Supreme Court will reverse an
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order granting a new trial when the record shows that
the trial court erred in an unmixed question of law. Oklahoma City vs. Wilson, 310 R 2d 369, (1968).
Further, it is clearly stated as a matter of evidence
relative to impeachment and credibility that acts of misconduct,, not resulting in a cx>nviction of a crime of dishonesty, are not proper subjects of cross-examination to
impeach a witness. In Packineau vs. United States, 8th
Cir., (1953), 202 F. 2d 681, a prosecution for violation
of the white slave act, where evidence was in conflict,
not overwhelming either way, it was held that the trial
court erred prejudicially in permitting the Defendant to
be cross-examined as to prior arrests for Mann Act violations and in permitting rebuttal testimony of an F. B. I.
Agent when it was attempted to show that the Defendant
had previously admitted such an arrest. The Court of
Appeals of the 8th Circuit further stated the validity of
the Rule that acts of misconduct, not resulting in conviction of a crime, are not proper subjects of cross-examination to impeach.
The same view was held by the Utah Supreme Court
in State of Utah vs. Cazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P. 2d
406, (1963). The Court pointed out that details or circumstances surrounding felonies for which the accused
has been convicted may not be inquired into upon crossexamination of an accused except under unusual circumstances, such as when inquiry would tend to show a
scheme, plan or modus operandi. The Court in the con-
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curring opinion mentions the case of State vs. Hougensen, 91 Utah 351, 64 P. 2d 229, (1936), as setting forth
the areas of cross-examination and setting forth the do's
and doot's related thereto. That, of course, included the
opportunity to ask one on a cross-examination whether
he had been convicted of a felony, but it is limited to
that as properly pointed out by the Court.
In the case at bar, not only did counsel for the Respondent elicit information relative to Appellant's filing
of bankruptcy, but further inquired relative to two judgments that were obtained against her as a result thereof,
raising a question of alleged misconduct on the part of
the Appellant. In light of the strict rules followed by
this jurisdiction and most others, this was clearly error
on the part of counsel and error on the part of the court
to make such an inquiry because the inquiry was relative
to specific acts and as such were not permitted for purposes of impeachment. Certainly, these errors account
for the no cause of action verdict against the Appellant,
who was merely sitting in her stopped automobile when
the Respondent caused the rear end collision which resulted in Appellant's serious injuries.
CONCLUSION
In the case at bar, the Court allowed testimony of
a specific act, a collateral matter, to attack the credibility
of the Appellant. That was a clear breach of the Court's
duty, was an error of law, and as such was not even required to be prejudicial, but was in fact, prejudicial to
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a fair hearing on the part of the Appellant. Therefore,
the Court's action was reversible error and a new trial
should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
HATCH & PLUMB

By
Qrrin G. Hatch

By
Winston Langlois
Attorneys for Appellants
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